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In this paper, we investigate dynamic price competition when firms strategically interact in 
two distinct but interrelated markets: a primary market  and  an  aftermarket, where indirect 
network effects arise. We set up a differential game of two-dimensional price competition and 
we  conclude  that  the  absence  of  price  competition  in  the  aftermarket  (competition  in  the 
market) fosters dynamic price competition in the primary market (competition for the market). 
We  also  investigate  the  impact  of  network  sizes  on  firms'  prices  in  the  primary  market 
concluding that, in equilibrium, larger firms have incentives to compete more fiercely for new 
"uncolonized" consumers. 
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In recent years, well-known competition policy cases such as Xerox ,
Kodak or Chrysler have raised the problem of incentives to compete in
industries where ￿rms are involved in two distinct but interrelated mar-
kets: (i) primary markets (where ￿rms sell an "original equipment" like a
printer, an hardware, an helicopter, a car...); and (ii) aftermarkets (where
￿rms provide complementary goods or services (CGS) such as ink car-
tridges, software programmes, helicopter spare parts, post-sale services like
maintenance or reparation services... ).
In these competition policy cases, it has been argued that competition
in aftermarkets was practically absent because consumers were signi￿cantly
locked in to equipment￿ s manufacturers and, consequently, equipment man-
ufacturers had the monopoly in the provision of CGS to their installed basis
of consumers.
In this paper, we explicitly deal with the interrelations between primary
markets and aftermarkets . Assuming that consumers are totally locked in
to the equipment￿ s producers (no direct competition in the aftermarket),
we raise the following questions: (i) to what extent the absence of compe-
tition in the aftermarket stimulates competition for new and uncolonized
consumers in the primary market? (ii) in the absence of competition in
aftermarkets, what are the determinants of the intensity of competition in
primary markets?
These questions are akin to the ones raised in the literature of stan-
dards competition, which (mostly informally) points out the existence of
a trade-o⁄ between competition in markets and competition for markets
(see Besen and Farrell (1994) or Geroski (2003)). Competition for markets
is entailed by ￿rms￿competition for the rents associated with an uncolo-
nized market (dynamic competition) and it is associated with competition
between incompatible standards (at the end, only one standard prevails).
Conversely, competition in markets corresponds to competition in a well-
established market, where several ￿rms have access to the technology be-
hind the prevalent standard (static competition). Hence, there is a trade-
o⁄ between competition for markets and competition in markets: intense
competition between standards can only arise when ￿rms expect quasi-
monopolistic rents for the prevalent standard (and these are only possible
when competition in markets is weak).
In the case of aftermarkets, an akin distinction may be pointed out. In
particular, one might think of competition for new uncolonized consumers
in the primary market as a phenomenon of competition for the market.
And, analogously, competition in the aftermarket, where ￿rms compete in
a well installed market could be conceived as a phenomenon of competition
in the market. In this context, the questions we wish to address in this
paper can be reformulated as follows: (i) does the absence of competition
in the market fosters competition for the market? (ii) in the absence of
3competition in the market, what determines the intensity of competition
for the market?
Considering the intrinsically dynamic nature of this problem, we deal
with the previous questions in the context of a simple di⁄erential linear-
quadratic game of two-dimensional price competition (in the primary mar-
ket and the aftermarket) with proprietary but partially compatible indirect
network e⁄ects (the utility of consumption in the aftermarket depends on
the number of costumers who own the same equipment version and, to a
smaller extent, on the number of costumers owning a distinct version of the
original equipment). We consider that both consumers and ￿rms are for-
ward looking agents and we derive the Linear Markov Perfect Equilibrium
(LMPE) of the linear-quadratic di⁄erential game (when it exists). Relying
on linear strategies, we analytically compute the solution of the dynamic
game and we identify (i) consumers￿linear Markovian expectation rules;
(ii) ￿rms￿linear Markovian price strategies in the primary market.
Our formulation considers that, in the primary market, ￿rms o⁄er two
di⁄erent versions of a similar equipment, whose expected life-time bene-
￿t per se is considered to be exogenous and independent of the equip-
ment version1. Conversely, in the aftermarket, we assume that ￿rms o⁄er
di⁄erentiated CGS. In particular, we consider that CGS present di⁄erent
intrinsic characteristics (horizontal di⁄erentiation) and, they also exhibit
di⁄erences in quality (vertical di⁄erentiation) entailed by indirect network
e⁄ects. Indeed, indirect network e⁄ects constitute a quite frequent phenom-
enon in industries where ￿rms simultaneously interact in primary markets
and aftermarkets. In fact, very often, ￿rms with larger market shares in
the primary market bene￿t from stronger learning experience/ learning
economies, which allow them to o⁄er a higher quality service in the after-
market. For example, in the case of reparation services, when consumers
are totally locked in, a ￿rm with a large basis of costumers, intervenes more
often in the aftermarket and, consequently, it detects more rapidly the typ-
ical failures of its equipment and the better way to deal with these failures.
Similarly, the greater the number of costumers of a certain printer, the more
likely it will be to ￿nd a good post-sale assistance (the equipment manu-
facturer can o⁄er a larger network of post-sale service providers and, in
addition, their technicians become more experienced (on-the job-training).
However, quite often (at least) part of these improvements entailed by in-
direct network e⁄ects can be appropriated by the rival ￿rm (di⁄usion of
unprotected knowledge). To account for this possibility we consider that
1This value might be either positive or null. When it is positive, we are implicitly
assuming that the equipment has an intrinsic positive value, which means that consumers
might use it even when they do not buy complementary goods/ services (e.g. a car, an
helicopter have a positive value for consumers even consumers do not purchase check up
services).
When this value is null, consumers only bene￿t from using the equipment when this
is used together with CGS (e.g. a printer is not useful without cartridges or a computer
is not useful without software).
4network e⁄ects are proprietary but partially compatible.
Main ￿ndings: Our ￿rst main ￿nding is that the absence of com-
petition in the market actually fosters competition for the market. In
particular, we show that, when consumers are totally locked in to their
equipment, the equilibrium prices in the primary markets are lower and, in
certain circumstances, they can even be negative. A direct implication of
this result is that the absence of competition in markets is not necessarily
welfare detrimental: it leads ￿rms to invest in price-cutting strategies in
primary markets and, as a consequence, it fosters the rhythm of technolog-
ical di⁄usion.
Our second main ￿nding concerns the determinants of the intensity of
price competition in the primary market (competition for the market).
Our results reveal that competition in the primary market is more intense,
(i) the greater the relative size of the aftermarket; (ii) the stronger the
intensity of indirect network e⁄ects; (iii) the smaller the degree of com-
patibility between networks; and (iv) the more importance ￿rms attach to
future earnings (the lower the e⁄ective discount rates).
Finally, we also show that, in a dynamic setting, the incentives to com-
pete for the market (i.e. set lower prices in the primary market) are pos-
itively related with the size of ￿rms￿basis of consumers: the larger is the
￿rm￿ s current basis of consumers, the greater will be the expected future
monopolist rents in the aftermarket and, accordingly, the more advanta-
geous it becomes to invest in price-cutting strategies to capture new con-
sumers in the primary market.
Related literature: Our model shares some features with existing
models investigating dynamic price competition in the presence of network
e⁄ects, namely Cabral (2007), Doganoglu (2003), Mitchell and Skrzypacz
(2006) and Laussel et al (2004). Our framework shares many similarities
with the one used by Cabral (2007), namely with respect to (i) the strate-
gic role played by subscription prices (in our case, equipment prices) on
￿rms￿dynamic choices and (ii) the forward looking behaviour of economic
agents. However, our model di⁄ers from Cabral (2007) with respect to
the fact that we explicitly model ￿rms￿behaviour in the aftermarket (con-
sidering that consumption of CGS exhibits decreasing marginal utilities )
while he assumes aftermarket outcomes to be exogenously determined. Ad-
ditionally, the two papers present substantial methodological di⁄erences.
While Cabral (2007) focus on Markov Perfect Equilibrium (without im-
posing linearity constraints), we focus on a narrower equilibrium concept
(the LMPE). The simpler nature of the LMPE, allows us to derive mar-
ket outcomes analytically, while Cabral (2007) has to rely on simulation
techniques to characterize dynamic price competition.
Doganoglu (2003) sets up a discrete model of dynamic price competition
in the presence of network e⁄ects and horizontal di⁄erentiation. However,
5di⁄erently from us, Doganoglu (2003) considers competition in spot prices
(there is no aftermarket) and myopic, instead of forward-looking, agents.
Mitchell and Skrzypacz (2006) built a dynamic model of price compe-
tition where the value of the product depends on current and past market
shares. Our model di⁄ers from Mitchell and Skrzypacz (2006) at the level of
consumers￿expectation rules and the nature of price competition (Mitchell
and Skrzypacz (2006) do not consider an aftermarket, investigating price
competition in terms of spot prices).
Our framework is also very close to the one pointed out in Laussel
et al (2004). However, di⁄erently from us, they focus on negative network
externalities (congestion e⁄ects) and, they do not consider ￿rms￿interaction
in an aftermarket.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the main
ingredients of the model. Section 3 points out consumers￿linear Markov
expectation rules and ￿rms￿linear Markov price strategies, which are used
in section 4 to compute the LMPE of the game. In section 5, we provide a
detailed analysis of our results, stressing the implications on the nature of
price competition between ￿rms. Finally, section 6 concludes and identi￿es
some lines for future research.
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Assumptions and notation
We consider two ￿rms (say ￿rm 1 and 2) involved in two interrelated
markets: a primary market (where each ￿rm sells a di⁄erent version of a
certain original equipment) and an aftermarket (where ￿rms provide exclu-
sive/ incompatible CGS). At each point of time t; ￿rm 1 and 2 interact in
these two markets: in the primary market, they strategically post equip-
ment prices and, in the aftermarket they choose the unit price of the CGS,
exploiting their own basis of (locked in) costumers. The price of the origi-
nal equipment sold by ￿rm i at period t is denoted by pi(t); and the unit
price of CGS o⁄ered by ￿rm i is denoted by vi(t).
The timing of consumers￿decisions is the following: at each point of time
t; a ￿ ow of new consumers (given by ￿) arrives to this industry and each new
consumer decides which equipment he/she is willing to buy. Such decision
is considered to be irreversible in the sense that switch of brands never
takes place due to prohibitively high switching costs (like learning costs,
habit formation,...). Thus, at each point of time t; older consumers (who
already own an equipment) only participate in the aftermarket, where they
choose the level of CGS they are willing to buy. Finally, we consider that
all consumers face a constant probability of "death" (￿) and, accordingly,
at each point of time t; some of the current equipment owners exit the
industry at a rate equal to ￿ (the total size of the market is stationary).
Concerning products￿characteristics, in the primary market, we con-
6sider that ￿rms o⁄er a technically similar equipment, in the sense that all
consumers get the same expected life-time utility (# ￿ 0) from the equip-
ment per se (independently of the equipment version). When # = 0, con-
sumers only bene￿t from the equipment when this is used together with
CGS purchase in the aftermarket. CGS o⁄ered by each ￿rm are considered
to be horizontally di⁄erentiated (CGS o⁄ered by each ￿rm have di⁄erent
intrinsic characteristics) as well as vertically di⁄erentiated (due to existence
of proprietary (though partially compatible) indirect network e⁄ects).
Concerning the di⁄erences in the intrinsic characteristics of the CGS,
we focus on horizontal di⁄erentiation a la Hotelling. In particular, we
consider that the spectrum of all possible variants of CGS is represented
by the interval [0;1] and we assume that CGS o⁄ered by ￿rm 1 are located
at 0; while CGS o⁄ered by its rival are located at 1: In the side of consumers,
there is a unit mass of consumers, uniformly distributed in the interval [0;1]
according to their most preferred variant of CGS. A consumer located at
x 2 ]0;1[ bears a utility loss due to the discrepancy between the services
rendered by his/her ideal ￿rm and the services actually rendered by the
existent ￿rms ("travel costs"). We model such utility loss a la d￿Aspremont
et al (1979), considering quadratic travel costs: the consumer x 2 [0;1]
bears a travel cost of ￿x2 when he/she purchases CGS from ￿rm 1 and
￿(1 ￿ x)2 if he/she purchases CGS from ￿rm 2 instead.
Concerning the di⁄erences in the quality of CGS entailed by indirect
network e⁄ects, we focus on the case of proprietary but partially compat-
ible network e⁄ects. Accordingly, we consider that the total number of
equipment owners indirectly exerts a positive in￿ uence on the utility ob-
tained from consumption of CGS in the aftermarket. However, the bene￿t
exerted by those consumers who own the same equipment version is greater
than the bene￿t exerted by those consumers who own a di⁄erent version
of the equipment.
We assume that all agents are forward-looking, i.e., at any time of the
game (in particular, by the time of purchasing the original equipment),
each consumer￿ s information set includes the rational expectations formu-
lated about interactions that will occur in subsequent stages of the game.
Similarly, ￿rms are able to perfectly anticipate other agents￿future deci-
sions.
In this context, we analyze agents behaviour and we characterize the
LMPE of the linear quadratic game above mentioned, stressing its im-
plications with respect to the equilibrium paths of prices in the primary
market (equipment￿prices) and analyzing to which extent the absence of
competition in the market stimulates competition for the market.
Notice that, we focus on the LMPE for two reasons. Firstly, our di⁄er-
ential game being linear quadratic, it is natural to search for the simplest
possible equilibrium strategies, i.e. the linear ones. Secondly, even though
it is known that, in general, there may exist non-linear strategies that
solve linear-quadratic di⁄erential games, such sophisticated strategies are
7technically di¢ cult (if not impossible) to compute analytically and, in the




At each moment t, equipment owners (old consumers) have to decide
on the level of CGS (ki) they are willing to purchase in the aftermarket.
Conditional on ￿rms￿market shares in the primary market, a consumer
who owns the version i (i = 1;2) of the original equipment obtains the
following instantaneous net utility3 from purchasing (at period t) a level of
ki CGS from ￿rm i :
U(x;ki(t);Di(t)) (1)




i(t)] ￿ vi(t)ki(t) ￿ ￿(x ￿ xi)2;
where ￿ > 0 is a constant that measures the intrinsic stand alone value of
CGS o⁄ered by ￿rm i in the aftermarket; Di(t) denotes the instantaneous
market share of ￿rm i in the primary market; ￿ 2 ]0;1[ measures the "degree
of compatibility" between rival networks, [Di(t) + ￿(1 ￿ Di(t))] measures
the total (indirect) network e⁄ect, ￿ > 0 is a constant that captures the
intensity of network e⁄ects (for a ￿xed size of the aftermarket); vi(t) cor-
responds to the unit price of CGS o⁄ered by ￿rm i (i = 1;2) at moment
t and xi denotes the location of ￿rm i in the aftermarket: more precisely,
x1 = 0 and x2 = 1.
If this consumer (who owns an equipment version i and is located at x)
decides to purchase CGS from ￿rm j (instead of ￿rm i); he/ she obtains a
net instantaneous utility of
U(x) = ￿vj(t)kj(t) ￿ ￿(x ￿ xj)2;
which is always negative because a consumer who owns an equipment ver-
sion i cannot get any bene￿t from CGS o⁄ered by ￿rm j as these are totally
incompatible with the equipment version of this consumer (lock in phenom-
enon). For this reason, a consumer who owns an equipment version i will
always prefer to buy the CGS o⁄ered by ￿rm i (in detriment of ￿rm j):
Notice also that the utility function in (1) exhibits three important
properties. Firstly, it explicitly accounts for the indirect network e⁄ects
2In particular, Cabral (2007) uses simulation techniques to analyze price competition
in the presence of network externalities.
3Notice that the utility function speci￿ed in (1) explicitly accounts for the indirect
network e⁄ects arising in this industry and, accordingly, it corresponds to a reduced
form of consumers utility.
8created by the interrelations between primary markets and aftermarkets:
consumers￿utility from buying CGS from ￿rm i depends on the size of the
market of this ￿rm in the primary market since manufacturers with larger
market shares in the primary markets bene￿t from more intense learning
and experience economies, being able to o⁄er higher-quality CGS.
Secondly, from (1) follows that networks are (at least partially) compat-
ible. In the context of our model, compatibility between networks means
that manufacturers might bene￿t (at least partially) from the rival￿ s learn-
ing and experience economies. The parameter ￿ 2 ]0;1[ measures the
extent to which ￿rms might appropriate the rival￿ s indirect network ef-
fect and, in our framework, it is considered to be exogenously determined.
When ￿ ! 0; owners of an equipment i do not bene￿t from the total num-
ber of owners of equipment j because manufacturers cannot appropriate
the rivals￿indirect network e⁄ects. In this case, indirect network e⁄ects
take the form of typical variant-speci￿c network e⁄ects4. In contrast, when
￿ ! 1; owners of equipment i bene￿t from the total number of consumers
in the industry (independently of the equipment version owned by these
consumers). Consequently, in this case, indirect network e⁄ects take the
form of industry-speci￿c network e⁄ects5.
Finally, from (1) follows that U0(ki) > 0 but U00(ki) < 0 and, as a
result, for given indirect network e⁄ects (i.e. for given market shares in
the primary market), consumption of CGS exhibits decreasing marginal
returns.
Considering the utility function in (1), the problem faced by equipment
owners (old consumers) at each point of time t consists in determine the
level of CGS (ki) they are willing to acquire from the ￿rm to which they are
locked in. The solution to this problem is given by the level of consumption
of CGS (ki) that maximizes the utility function in (1). Therefore, at each
moment t; the individual demand of CGS by a owner of an equipment i is
simply
ki(vi(t);Di(t)) = ￿ ￿
vi(t)
Di(t) + ￿(1 ￿ Di(t))
; (2)
where the unit price (vi(t)) in equation (1) is posted by ￿rm i at moment
t: The individual demand in (2) implicitly assumes that, at each moment t;
￿rms are not able to commit to the prices of future complementary goods or
services. For some aftermarkets, this lack of commitment assumption seems
to be quite reasonable: for example, in the case of printers we observe that
printers￿producers do not usually commit themselves to the prices they
will charge for the cartridges sold to consumers in the future.
4For example, in the case of helicopters, this situation would arise when equip-
ment manufacturers cannot imitate rival￿ s quality improvements entailed by learning
economies associated with the exploitation of its own market of helicopters.
5For example, in the case of helicopters, this situation would arise in case of perfect
di⁄usion of quality improvements resulting from learning economies entailed by indirect
network e⁄ects.
9In these circumstances, ￿rms post vi(t) with the only purpose of maxi-







Di(t) + ￿(1 ￿ Di(t))
￿
Di(t); (3)
where, without loss of generality6, production costs are normalized to zero.
Therefore, ￿rm i0s optimal pricing policy in the aftermarket is given by
v￿
i (Di(t)) =
￿[Di(t) + ￿(1 ￿ Di(t))]
2
(4)
and, at equilibrium, ￿rm i0s pro￿ts in the aftermarket (conditional on man-







(1 ￿ ￿)Di(t)2 + ￿Di(t)
￿
: (5)
When the price of CGS is posted according to (4), a consumer that owns
the variant i of the original equipment and is located at position x obtains
the following utility from consumption of CGS o⁄ered by manufacturer i:
U(x;Di(t)) = ￿ + [Di(t) + ￿(1 ￿ Di(t))]
￿2
8
￿ ￿(x ￿ xi)2: (6)
Notice that, the higher the number of consumers who own an equipment
of version i; (i) the higher the price of CGS charged by ￿rm i (equation (4));
(ii) the higher the pro￿ts obtained by this ￿rm (equation (5)) and, ￿nally,
(iii) the higher7 the net instantaneous utility obtained by each owner of an














(1 ￿ ￿)Di(t) +
￿2
4







(1 ￿ ￿) > 0 (9)
6The qualitative nature of our results would not change if one considers constant and
symmetric marginal costs.
7Indeed, the higher quality of the CGS provided by ￿rm i more than compensates the
higher price charged by this ￿rm as a result of an increasing in the number of consumers
who own its equipment:
102.2.2. Primary market
In the primary market, ￿rms sell di⁄erent versions of the same original
equipment to new consumers (those who don￿ t own an original equipment).
More precisely, at each moment t; a set of new (potential) consumers arrives
to this industry at a rate of ￿: At the moment of entry, new (potential)
consumers have to choose which equipment (if any) they are willing to
buy. Consumers￿choices will be determined by (i) the expected life-time
utility obtained from the equipment per se, which is exogenously given
by # ￿ 0 for both ￿rms; (ii) the equipment price pi(t);i = 1;2; which
is posted by ￿rms at each period of time; and (iii) the expected life-time
utility obtained from future consumption of CGS. The expected life-time
utility obtained from future consumption of CGS corresponds to the stream
of instantaneous utilities obtained from future consumption of CGS. More
precisely, it will be determined by (i) the intrinsic characteristics of CGS
o⁄ered by each ￿rm (horizontal di⁄erentiation); (ii) the expected evolution
of ￿rms￿market shares in the primary market (which determines the de-
gree of indirect network e⁄ects that ￿rm i and j will be able to reach in
the aftermarket); and, ￿nally (iii) the expected price to be paid for CGS
eventually purchased in the future.
Under these circumstances, a consumer located at x 2 [0;1] who con-
siders to buy the equipment version produced by ￿rm i; expects to get the






where U(x;Di(t)) is given by equation (6); r > 0 is the discount rate and
￿ is the probability that this consumer exits the industry. The sum r + ￿







since (i) Di is bounded below by 0; and (ii) (x￿xi)2 is bounded above by
1.
The expected net life-time surplus (Vi(x;t)) obtained by a new consumer
x who purchases the version i of the original equipment is simply given
by the sum of the life-time utility obtained from the equipment per se
(# ￿ 0) and the expected life-time utility from future consumption of CGS
(Ci(x;t)) net of the price to be paid for this equipment (pi(t)):










11which means that the "travel cost" is relatively small in comparison with
the bene￿ts obtained from consumption of CGS. This implies that the
expected life-time utility from consumption of CGS is always positive and
it can be shown that condition (12) is su¢ cient to ensure that all consumers
expect to have non-negative net life-time surplus in a Nash equilibrium8,
guaranteeing that all the consumers arriving in this industry have incentives
to buy a piece of the original equipment. This constitutes a fairly standard
assumption9 that rules out the rather trivial case of local monopolies where
some of the new consumers would not buy any of the available versions of
the equipment.
Consider a consumer who enters the market at moment t; buying the
original equipment produced by ￿rm i and let us de￿ne the expected lifetime











8 ￿i(t) represents the expected value of the discounted stream
of future bene￿ts obtained with the consumption of CGS gross of "travel
costs" for a consumer who decided to buy equipment i at moment t:










because Di(t) 2 [0;1]; and second,




because D1(t) + D2(t) = 1.
Furthermore, considering (13), equation (11) can be more conveniently
written as










In this context, new consumers arriving in the industry at period t will
compare the expected net life-time surplus associated with each equipment
version and, obviously, they will buy the equipment from the ￿rm which
provides them the higher expected net life-time surplus.
Since consumers are forward-looking agents who formulate rational ex-
pectations, they are able to perfectly forecast the future time path of ￿rms￿




r+￿. It can be shown that ￿
￿+￿ ￿ b pi (for
further detail, see proposition 6 afterwards). Consequently, condition (12) assures that,
at the Nash equilibrium, all consumers have incentives to buy an original equipment.
9See for instance d￿Aspremont et al (1979).
12market shares and, henceforth, they perfectly anticipate the net life-time
surplus they can get from each of the alternative equipment versions.
As a consequence, at a given moment of time t; a new consumer located












￿2(t) ￿ p2(t): (17)
Conversely, when the reverse inequality holds, this consumer prefers to
buy the equipment version o⁄ered by ￿rm 2:
The consumer located at x = ~ x; such that condition (17) holds with
equality, is indi⁄erent between buying the equipment version o⁄ered by
￿rm 1 or the one o⁄ered by ￿rm 2. For such consumer, the di⁄erential in
the equipment prices charged by the two ￿rms:
p1(t) ￿ p2(t);
is exactly compensated by the gap in the expected life-time utilities ob-
tained from future consumption of CGS:
￿2
8









For given p1(t), p2(t), ￿1(t) and ￿2(t) =
1+￿
r+￿ ￿ ￿1(t)10 , there exists a







(p2(t) ￿ p1(t))(r + ￿) + ￿
2
4 ￿1(t)(r + ￿) ￿ ￿
2




When e x(t) 2 [0;1], consumers entering the market at t and located to
the left of e x(t) choose to buy equipment version 1. Conversely, consumers
entering the market at t but located to the right of e x(t) choose to buy
version 2. When e x(t) < 0, the entire set of new consumers at time t would
prefer version 2 to version 1: In contrast, when e x(t) > 1, the entire set
of new consumers at time t would prefer version 1 to 2: In this paper, we
focus on the competitive solutions, where both ￿rms keep positive market
shares. Thereby, we rule out the two last cases, assuming that
￿￿ ￿ (p2(t) ￿ p1(t))(r + ￿) +
￿2
4
￿1(t)(r + ￿) ￿
￿2
8
(1 + ￿) ￿ ￿ (19)
Given that, at each moment t; new consumers come to the industry at
a rate equal to ￿; from equation (18) it follows that, provided that (19)
10By equation (15)
13holds11, the number of new consumers of equipment version 1 at moment
t is equal to d1(t) = ￿e x(t) and the number of new consumers choosing
to buy version 2 at moment t is given by d2(t) = ￿[1 ￿ e x(t)]. Note that
d1(t) + d2(t) = ￿, given the full market coverage assumption associated
with condition (12).
2.3. Firms￿pro￿ts
The ￿rm i￿ s cash ￿ ow at time t is the sum of the revenues obtained in
the aftermarket at time t (given by equation (5)) and the revenues obtained
in the primary market (sales of new equipment). For simplicity reasons and
without loss of generality12 we consider null production costs. Thus, ￿rm





(1 ￿ ￿)Di(t)2 + ￿Di(t)
￿
+ pi(t)di(t); (20)
where di(t) is the instantaneous demand of the equipment version o⁄ered
by ￿rm i13.
Considering equation (18) and denoting ￿
2
4 by a (and from now on, we
shall interpret a as a measure of the intensity of network e⁄ects for a given











where i;j = 1;2; i 6= j:
From equation (21), we can determine the net rate of variation in the
size of the "locked in market" of ￿rm i (i.e., in the ￿rm i0s instantaneous
market share; Di(t)), which consists on the in￿ ow of new consumers who
bought ￿rm￿ s i version of the equipment (di(t)) net of the instantaneous




= di(t) ￿ ￿Di(t): (22)
Given the instantaneous pro￿t function (equation (20)), at each point
of time, ￿rms will strategically choose the equipment price, taking into
11If condition (19) does not hold, then we have to deal with an instantaneous market
where all new consumers strictly prefer the same ￿rm, say ￿rm i.
12Considering symmetric positive constant marginal costs of production would not
change the qualitative nature of our results.
13If we wish to be completely general, we could proceed as follows. Given the set
S = f0;1; e xg, de￿ne midf0;1; e xg to be e x if e x 2 [0;1], to be 0 if e x < 0, and to be 1 if
e x > 1. Then the ￿ow demand facing ￿rm 1 is d1(t) = ￿midf0;1; e x(t)g and the ￿ow
demand facing ￿rm 2 is d2(t) = ￿￿d1(t).In what follows, we shall assume e x 2 [0;1] and
ignore this complication.
14account that consumers are irreversibly locked in to the ￿rm that produces
the equipment they have chosen to buy by the moment they have entered
the market.
More precisely, each ￿rm i will choose the path of equipment prices,






subject to the market shares￿transition equation, given by (22).
In the following section, we give a step further and we analyze the
consumers￿linear Markov expectation rules and the ￿rms￿linear Markov
subscription price strategies.
3. LINEAR MARKOV EXPECTATIONS AND STRATEGIES
Consumers￿expectations and ￿rms￿price strategies are said to be Markov-
ian when they only depend on the state vector, which conveys all the payo⁄
relevant information. In our framework, the state vector at moment t is the
vector of the size of ￿rms￿"locked-in" networks at time t; i.e. (D1(t);D2(t)):
Consequently, both consumers￿expectations and ￿rms￿strategies are ex-
clusively based on the vector (D1(t);D2(t)) and, accordingly, they can be
written as a function of these two variables. In particular, in the case of
linear Markov perfection, they can be expressed as linear functions of the
state vector. The next subsections provide a formal de￿nition of consumers￿
Markov expectation rules and ￿rms￿Markov price strategies.
3.1. Linear Markov expectation rules
At time t; new consumers formulate expectations on the life-time sur-
plus obtained from each of the alternative equipment versions. Such expec-
tations are determined by consumers￿expectations ￿e
1(t) and ￿e
2(t) of the
actual values ￿1(t) and ￿2(t), which, according to equation (13), are de-
termined by the trajectories of the ￿rms￿market shares (D1(t) and D2(t)).
In the presence of forward-looking agents, as it is the case here, consumers
perfectly anticipate future market shares and
￿e
i(t) = ￿i(t):
In this context, a Markov expectation rule is a pair of functions (F1(:);F2(:))
that generate the values ￿e
1(t) and ￿e
2(t) from what consumers currently
observe, namely the market shares D1(t) and D2(t). This pair of functions
maps any observed point (D1(t);D2(t)) on the unit simplex
￿ = f(D1(t);D2(t)) j 0 ￿ Di(t) ￿ 1 , D1(t) + D2(t) = 1g





In the special case where the expectation rule is linear, the following
Lemma holds:
Lemma 1. The linear Markov expectation rules formulated by forward-
looking consumers must be of the form
￿e












￿ (￿1 + ￿2) (27)
Proof. see the Appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that, in a competitive framework, forward-looking con-
sumers expect a positive correlation between the current number of con-
sumers owning a certain equipment version and the future "locked in"
market dominated by this ￿rm (i.e., @￿e
i(t)=@Di(t) > 0). Therefore, under
rational expectations, equipment owners extrapolate from current market
shares that, for given travel costs and subscription fees, the larger is the
current market share of a given ￿rm i, the greater will be the expected
life-time surplus, Vi(x;t); of buying the equipment provided by this ￿rm.
3.2. Linear Markov price strategies
A ￿rm i is said to adopt a Markov price strategy when the equipment
price it charges is exclusively based on its knowledge of the size of its
current "locked in" market (Di(t)) and the size of the the rival￿ s "locked
in" market. In other words, under Markov pricing strategies, the state
vector (Di(t);Dj(t)) conveys all the payo⁄-relevant information and, con-
sequently, it is the only determinant of the price of equipment charged by
￿rms.
In our framework, a Markov pricing strategy is denoted by Pi(:) and
it is a function that maps any observed point (D1(t);D2(t)) on the unit
simplex ￿ to a point pi(t) on the real number line. Thus
Pi(D1(t);D2(t)) = pi(t):
16Again, since D1 + D2 = 1, we can write
Pj(Di;Dj) = Pj(1 ￿ Dj;Dj) ￿ e pj(Dj) ￿ e pj(1 ￿ Di):
In the special case of linear Markovian strategies, the equipment￿prices
set by ￿rm 1 and 2 must be of the form
pi(t) = e pi(Di(t)) = ￿i + siDi(t);i = 1;2. (28)
A linear Markovian price strategy, e p￿
i(Di); is said to be the best reply of
￿rm i to both the rival ￿rm￿ s price strategy, e pj(1￿Di), and the consumers￿
expectation rules (fi(Di);fj(Dj)), if for any initial market share in the
equipment￿market _Di(0)_ ￿rm i chooses a price strategy e p￿
i(Di); yielding
a time path that maximizes the discounted value of future accumulated
pro￿ts. More precisely, ￿rm i is giving its best reply when it chooses a
time path for pi(t) that maximizes the present value of the expected stream
of future cash ￿ ows subject to the market shares￿transition equation. Thus,
the subscription price strategy e p￿








_ Di(t) = di (t) ￿ ￿Di(t) (30)
















(1 ￿ ￿)Di(t)2 + ￿Di(t)
￿
+ pi(t)di(t): (34)
Note that, due to the linearity of consumers￿expectation rules and the
linearity of ￿rms￿price strategies, the previous problem corresponds to a
standard in￿nite horizon optimal control problem with a linear-quadratic
structure14.
In the following section, we derive the LPME of the game (when it
exists) and we provide its complete characterization.
14For theorems stating necessary and su¢ cient conditions, see, for example, Long and
Leonard(1992, Chapter 9).
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i(:) is ￿rm i￿ s best reply to both the pricing strategy e pj(:) and the
expectation rule (fi(:);fj(:)), for i;j = 1;2;i 6= j; and








= di(t) ￿ ￿Di(t) (35)
with di(t) given by (32).
From de￿nition 1; it follows that, in the LMPE of the game, ￿rms
optimally choose the path pi (t) (given the rival￿ s price strategy and the
consumers￿expectation rules) and, simultaneously, consumers optimally
choose which equipment to buy, perfectly anticipating the evolution of
￿rms￿market shares in the equipment market (i.e. the primary market).
The rest of the section is devoted to the identi￿cation of the LMPE
of the game. We start with the analysis of ￿rms￿optimal price strategies.
Then, we focus on the equilibrium expectation rules and, ￿nally, we provide
a full description of the LMPE of the game.
In the LPME, both ￿rms choose the trajectories of equipment prices
e p￿
i(Di);i = 1;2; which solve the optimal control problem (29)-(34), given
consumers￿expectation rules (fi(Di);fj(Dj)) and the price strategy of the
rival ￿rm
e pj(1 ￿ Di) = e pj(Dj) = ￿j + sjDj;j = 1;2;i 6= j:
We introduce the current-value co-state variable ￿i(t) and we de￿ne the
current-value Hamiltonian for ￿rm i as
Hi(t) = (pi(t)+￿i(t))di(pi(t);Di(t))+a
￿















18The necessary conditions to guarantee that ￿rm i is optimally choosing
the price of its equipment include:
￿i(t) =
2￿ ￿ a(1 + ￿)
2(r + ￿)









A similar set of equations is obtained from ￿rm j￿ s optimal control
problem. From the two sets of equations, it is possible to determine the
equilibrium linear Markov price strategies, conditional on consumers￿ex-
pectations.
Lemma 2. Equilibrium linear Markov price strategies condi-
tional on consumers￿expectations
Given consumers￿expectation rules (i.e., given the parameters b and ￿i;i =
1;2), any pair of equilibrium linear pricing strategies e pi(Di) = ￿i + siDi
must have the following properties
(i) s1 = s2 = s;with s satisfying the following condition
(r + 2￿)(3s ￿ ab) +
2
2￿
￿(r + ￿)(2s ￿ ab)
2 ￿ 2a(￿ ￿ 1) = 0; and (39)








Proof. see the Appendix.
Given the fact that consumers are forward looking agents, in the LMPE,
they perfectly anticipate the equilibrium linear Markov price strategies
pointed out in lemma 2: Therefore, in the equilibrium linear expectation
rules, the constants ￿1, ￿2 and b in (24) must respect the restrictions pointed
out in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Equilibrium expectation rules conditional on price
strategies
Given ￿1, ￿2 and s, the rational expectation requirement that ￿e
i(t) = ￿i(t)
can be satis￿ed by a linear expectation rule if and only if the constants ￿i
and b satisfy the following conditions:
(i) for b :
1
2￿
[ab2￿(r + ￿) ￿ 2b(s￿(r + ￿) + ￿(r + 2￿)) + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)] = 0 (41)
19(ii) for ￿i :
￿i =
2b￿(r + ￿)(￿i ￿ ￿j) + ab￿(1 + ￿) ￿ 2bs￿(r + ￿) ￿ 2b￿￿ ￿ 4￿￿
2(r + ￿)(ab￿ ￿ 2￿)
; (42)
i;j = 1;2; i 6= j
Proof. see the Appendix.
Using equations (42) and subtracting ￿2 from ￿1 one obtains




Condition (43) shows that, in the LMPE of the game, the gap ￿1 ￿ ￿2
in the consumers￿expectation rules is proportional to the gap ￿1 ￿ ￿2 in
the ￿rms￿price strategies in the primary market.
In the LMPE of the game, consumers￿expectation rules met the re-
quirements in lemma 3 and, simultaneously, ￿rms￿price strategies in the
primary market met the conditions in lemma 2: As a consequence, equilib-
rium price strategies and expectation rules will be perfectly symmetric as
claimed in lemma 4; below.
Lemma 4. Equilibrium price strategies and expectation rules
In the LMPE of the game:
(i) consumers￿expectation rules are perfectly symmetric, in the sense that
b1 = b2 = b and ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿;
(ii) ￿rms￿price strategies are perfectly symmetric, in the sense that s1 =
s2 = s and ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿:
Proof. see the Appendix.
Lemma 4 illustrates the symmetric nature of the competitive LMPE of
the game. In the LMPE, the responsiveness of equipment prices to changes
in the instantaneous market shares in the primary (the "locked in" market)
is the same for both ￿rms (s1 = s2 = s). In addition, the price equilib-
rium strategies have the same intercept (￿1 = ￿2 = ￿). Consequently, at
equilibrium, any di⁄erences in the price of di⁄erent equipment versions can
only be explained by an initial asymmetry in the size of ￿rms￿"locked in"
market. Similarly, consumers￿expectations on the evolution of the ￿rms￿
market shares are also symmetric: the expectation rules￿intercepts are the
same for the two ￿rms (￿1 = ￿2 = ￿) and the expected responsiveness of
￿rms￿future market shares with respect to current market shares is also
the same for both ￿rms (b1 = b2 = b).
204.1. A Complete Characterization of the LMPE
In the LMPE, consumers￿expectations on the evolution of size of ￿rms
"locked in" market (i.e. ￿rms￿future market shares in the primary market)
correspond to the equilibrium Markovian rules pointed out in equations
(41) and (42), i = 1;2. Similarly, ￿rms post the prices of their equipment
according to the equilibrium price strategies described by equations (39)
and (40), i = 1;2:
This provides us six equilibrium conditions, which can be used to solve
for the LMPE and determine the equilibrium values of the six unknowns
of the model: b;s;￿1;￿2;￿1 and ￿2. 15
The following proposition and lemmas provide a complete characteri-
zation of the LMPE of the game (when it exists). In proposition 1; we
identify the existence and uniqueness conditions. Then, when existence
conditions are met, we solve for the LMPE of the game, which is pointed
out in lemmas 5 to 7.
Proposition 1. Existence and uniqueness of the LMPE
(i) A unique competitive LMPE exists if and only if the intensity of
network e⁄ects (a) satis￿es:
a ￿
￿(6r + 4￿)
(5r + 6￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
: (44)
(ii) Two competitive LMPE exist if and only if r <
2￿ p
5 and the intensity
of network e⁄ects (a) satis￿es:
￿(6r + 4￿)










(iii) When none of the above conditions is met, no competitive LMPE
exists16.
Proof. see the Appendix.
Proposition 1 points out the conditions for the existence and uniqueness
of the LMPE. These conditions bear on the intensity of network e⁄ects; on
the discount rate and on the probability of exiting the industry. For weak
network e⁄ects, the LMPE exists and it is unique. Conversely, for strong
network e⁄ects, no competitive LMPE exists. In those circumstances, two
scenarios are possible: either the game has no LMPE at all, or monopoly
15It turns out that the equations can be solved sequentially. First, the two equations
(39) and (41) determine b￿ and s￿, and their values are dependent on a . Second, ￿￿
and ￿￿ are dependent on b￿ but not on s￿:
16More precisely, the game does not have any LMPE when
(i) r <
2￿ p














21arises in the LMPE. In the last case, network e⁄ects are so strong (and
consequently, the primary market and aftermarkets are so closely related)
that the smaller ￿rm is forced to leave the market, after some periods of
interaction. Finally, for intermediate network e⁄ects, there are two LMPE,
as long as ￿rms do not discount too much future earnings. In that case,
exiting the market is not in the interest of the smaller network and, conse-
quently, the LMPE exists and, due to the relative importance of network
e⁄ects, two LMPE might arise depending on agents￿decisions.
From now on, we assume that existence conditions are met and we
provide a complete description of the LMPE of the game.
Lemma 5. Responsiveness of consumers￿ expectations to the
size of ￿rms￿"locked in" markets
In equilibrium, b￿;the responsiveness of consumers￿expectations to changes
in the size of ￿rms￿"locked in" markets (i.e. ￿rms￿current market shares
in the primary market) corresponds to the solution of the cubic polynomial









b3a￿(r + ￿)(r + 2￿)+
b2 ￿
4a￿(￿ + r)(1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿(r + 2￿)2￿
￿





In the presence of weak network e⁄ects (i.e., a satis￿es (44)), b￿ ￿ 1
r+2￿ is






: In the presence of intermediate
network e⁄ects (i.e. a satis￿es (45)), as long as r <
2￿ p
5; there are two









Proof. Follows directly from condition (71) in the proof of proposition
1.
Lemma 6. Responsiveness of equipment￿prices to the size of
￿rms￿"locked in" markets
In equilibrium, s￿,the responsiveness of equipment￿prices to changes in the
size of ￿rms￿"locked in" markets (i.e. ￿rms￿current market shares in the
primary market) is given by
s￿(b￿) =
2￿ (r + 2￿)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ b￿(r + 2￿))
￿(r + ￿)(b￿ (r + 2￿) + 4(1 ￿ ￿))
< 0: (47)
Proof. see the Appendix.
Lemma 7. Equilibrium intercepts
The equilibrium rational expectation rules are fi(Di) = ￿
￿ +b￿Di; i = 1;2;
where b￿ is given in lemma 5, and the equilibrium intercept, ￿
￿; is given by
￿(b￿) > 0, with
￿(b￿) = ￿ =
1 + ￿ ￿ b￿ (r + ￿)
2(r + ￿)
> 0 (48)
22The equilibrium pricing strategies are pi = ￿￿+s￿ Di; i = 1;2; where s￿ < 0







3 ￿(r + ￿)(r + 2￿)(r + 3￿)+
+(b￿)
2 ￿(r2 + 5r￿ + 2￿2 + ￿(r2 + 3r￿ + 6￿2))+





2 ￿(￿ + ￿)2(4(1 ￿ ￿) + b￿(￿ + 2￿))
(49)

















Proof. see the Appendix.
The previous lemmata provide us a complete description of the LMPE
of the game. Lemma 5 together with lemma 7 elucidate us about the equi-
librium expectation rules. Lemma 6 together with lemma 7 identi￿es the
equilibrium price strategies to be adopted by ￿rms when they strategically
choose the price of their equipment. In the following section, the nature of
￿rms￿price competition is analyzed in detail.
5. PRICE COMPETITION IN THE PRIMARY MARKET
5.1. Does the absence of competition in markets fosters
competition for the market?
Lemmas 6 and 7 describe the equilibrium path of equipment prices:From
lemma 7; it follows that, at time t; the ￿xed component of the equipment
price (￿) can be either positive or negative, depending on the value of a,
which constitutes a measure of network intensities for a given size of the
aftermarket. When indirect network e⁄ects are weak (for low values of a),
￿ will be positive: consumers do not signi￿cantly bene￿t from the con-
sumption of other consumers17 and, as a result, the ￿xed component of
the equipment price is positive. This is equivalent to say that, at period t;
dumping (i.e., charging pi below marginal cost) is not an optimal strategy
for any ￿rm i who has just entered the industry (Di(t) = 0): Conversely,
when indirect network e⁄ects are strong enough (and LMPE exists), ￿ is
negative. In the last case, consumers signi￿cantly bene￿t from consumption
of other consumers (for example, when the size of the ￿rm entails strong
learning and experience economies). Accordingly, when setting the price of
their equipment, each ￿rm will o⁄er a ￿xed discount (￿) in order to attract
17This might be the case in an industry where ￿rms cannot exploit learning or expe-
rience economies.
23new consumers, who will increase the value of ￿rms￿CGS (since indirect
network e⁄ects are strong), stimulating consumption in the aftermarket.
The model also predicts (lemma 6) a negative correlation between the
optimal equipment price charged by a given ￿rm and its current (instan-
taneous) market shares in the primary market, i.e. the size of its "locked
in" market (given that s￿ < 0). In other words, ceteris paribus, an increase
in the number of consumers who own certain equipment version, entails a
decrease in price paid to acquire such version. This e⁄ect is stemming from
the dynamic interrelations between the primary market and aftermarkets.
When the aftermarket is su¢ ciently pro￿table, these interrelations create
endogenous and signi￿cant incentives to invest in cutting-price strategies
in the primary market.
More precisely, these dynamic interrelations entail a negative relation
between the pricing policy in the primary market and ￿rms￿market shares
in that market because, when ￿rms charge lower prices in the primary
market, they increase their basis of consumers in the aftermarkets. The
enlargement of the basis of (locked-in) consumers in the aftermarket leads
to an increase in ￿rms revenues obtained in the aftermarket, not only be-
cause more consumers buy CGS from this ￿rm but also because this ￿rm is
able to charge higher prices for these CGS (see equation 4). Therefore, as
long as the aftermarket is su¢ ciently pro￿table, ￿rms with a larger basis
of "locked in" consumers have even more incentives to adopt cutting-price
policies in the primary market.
In our setting, the aftermarket is always su¢ ciently pro￿table to entail
this negative relation due to the shape of instantaneous pro￿ts in the after-
market ((see equation (5)). This function is quadratic in market shares and
this generates increasing returns in this variable: the enlargement of the ex-
isting basis of costumers of a given equipment i allows this ￿rm to raise the
price of CGS on a larger set of consumers. Consequently, today￿ s bene￿t
(in terms of changes in aftermarket pro￿ts) from gaining a new costumer,
will be greater for larger networks. The explanation for this (apparently)
paradoxical result lies on the dynamic mechanisms underlying our model.
As shown in the following lemma, in a static setting, larger ￿rms do not
have more incentives to compete for the market since limr!1 s￿(b￿) = 0:
Lemma 8. In a static setting, larger ￿rms do not have incentives to set




Conversely, in a dynamic context, larger ￿rms do have more incentives
to adopt price-cutting strategies in the primary market. Indeed, larger
￿rms have more incentives to enlarge their current basis of "locked in cos-
tumers" in order to bene￿t (during several periods) from greater future
24revenues in the aftermarket. Within our model, such dynamic mechanism
is conveyed by the co-state variable ￿i(t). This variable can be interpreted
as the expected total (current and future) extra-pro￿ts associated with a
marginal increase in ￿rm￿ s instantaneous market shares (the shadow price
of the state variable). From equation (37), it is easy enough to see that
the equilibrium value of ￿
￿ depends positively on Di(t); which in turn
negatively a⁄ects the equipment prices for the reasons explained above.
Therefore, when one accounts for the dynamic incentives underlying price
competition in the primary market, we conclude that, in a dynamic setting,
larger ￿rms have more incentives to sacri￿ce current revenues in the pri-
mary market in order to expand the basis of future "locked in" consumers
and obtain greater revenues in the aftermarket (during several periods).
Therefore, one of our main results is that, in a dynamic framework,
larger ￿rms have incentives to compete more ￿ercely for the market (i.e.
charge lower prices in the primary market) in order to exploit the rents
associated from the lack of competition in the aftermarket.
5.2. Trajectories of market shares
In the previous section, we concluded that larger ￿rms charge lower
prices for their equipment. Furthermore, from equation (9) follows that
the instantaneous utilities with CGS purchased by a consumer who owns
a certain equipment version are also positively a⁄ected by the number of
total costumers of that version. For these reasons, one could think that an
increasing proportion of new consumers would prefer to buy the equipment
o⁄ered by the larger manufacturer and, sooner or later, the smaller network
would be forced to leave the market. However, that is not necessarily the
case because despite the attractiveness of the equipment version o⁄ered by
the larger manufacturer to new consumers, this ￿rm is faced with higher
exit rates (￿Di(t)): Therefore, if indirect network e⁄ects are not too strong,
after some periods of interaction, the smaller ￿rm will be able to overcome
its disadvantage and, in the steady state equilibrium, the ￿rms divide the
market evenly.
Indeed, the equilibrium trajectories of ￿rms￿market shares in the pri-





i(t) ￿ ￿Di(t): (50)
where d￿
i(t) is the instantaneous demand for equipment version i when
￿rms are setting the LMPE equipment prices (the ones which follow from
lemmas 5-7). This leaves us with a ￿rst order di⁄erential equation, which













25Proposition 2. Market shares￿ trajectories: rate of conver-
gence
In the LMPE, market shares converge to the steady state equilibrium
￿




a rate given by
1 ￿ ￿
b￿ ￿ (r + ￿) (52)
The rate of convergence to the steady state market shares is decreasing in
the equilibrium responsiveness of consumers￿ expectations to the relative
size of ￿rms￿"locked in" market (b￿): This means that convergence to the
steady state is slower, the stronger are the network e⁄ects(a is larger) and
the less di⁄erentiated are the CGS o⁄ered in the aftermarket (￿ is smaller).
Proof. From equation (52); it is straightforward to see that the rate
of convergence is decreasing in b￿: Furthermore, from equation (46) it is
straightforward as well to see that b￿ is increasing in a
￿ whenever a ￿
￿(6￿+4￿)
(5￿+6￿)(1￿￿):
The former proposition shows that when the indirect network e⁄ect is
stronger and consumers attribute an higher value to the total number of cos-
tumers who own a similar equipment, an entrant￿ s market share increases
more slowly than in a less pro￿table market. This parallels Doganoglu￿ s
(2000) results according to which positive consumption externalities slow
down convergence towards the steady state.
5.3. Steady state equipment prices





























Proof. see the Appendix.
The previous proposition shows that, in the steady state LMPE, as
long as indirect network e⁄ects are relatively strong (and consequently b￿
is higher), the steady state equipment prices are negative. This means
that, for a given size of the aftermarket, when network indirect e⁄ects are
relatively strong, ￿rms might be willing to pay to new costumers, in order to
26convince them to buy their equipment versions. Conversely, when network
e⁄ects are relatively weak, the steady state equipment prices are positive.
In any case, it should be noticed that, in the steady state of our game,
￿rms are charging lower equipment prices than the ones they would charge
in the absence of network e⁄ects. In the absence of network e⁄ects, a ! 0;
and it is easy to check that b pi ! ￿
r+￿
18: This means that ￿rms would
charge steady-state equipment prices equal to four times the present value
of the travel cost supported by the marginal consumer19:




According to proposition 3; the reduction in price due to the existence of
network e⁄ects depends on the parameters of the model, such as the e⁄ec-
tive interest rate (r+￿) and the degree of compatibility between networks.







b￿2r(r + 2￿) ￿ (5r + 8￿)b￿ + 4
￿
b￿2￿(r + ￿)2(4 + b￿(r + 2￿))







:Consequently, the degree of in-
compatibility between networks enhances the importance of network ef-
fects. When ￿ ! 0; consumers cannot bene￿t at all from network indirect
e⁄ects created by the rival￿ s network and, accordingly, when networks are
fully incompatible, the importance of investing in the creation of a "locked
in" market is even larger and ￿rms will always charge lower steady state
equipment prices than the ones that would be charged in the absence of
indirect network e⁄ects.





2￿ ((r + 2￿))




When networks are fully compatible, ￿rms￿speci￿c network e⁄ects are no
longer relevant (because consumers bene￿t as well from the rivals￿net-
work). As a consequence, once consumers are locked in to equipment man-
ufacturers, ￿rms do not have any incentives to expand their own networks
(because they can bene￿t as well from rival￿ s indirect network bene￿ts).
Consequently, when choosing prices in the primary market, ￿rm will set
higher equipment prices (in comparison with the ones that would prevail
in the absence of indirect network e⁄ects). The justi￿cation for this is the
18From equation (46) b￿ !
1￿￿
r+2￿ as a ! 0:
19In the steady state equilibrium, the marginal consumer is located at a distance of
1/2 of both ￿rms.
27fact that, under perfect compatibility, ￿rms can appropriate all the (poten-
tial) "network bene￿ts" obtained by consumers. Thus, in our framework,
the degree of compatibility between networks (￿) can be interpreted as a
kind of "network e⁄ects multiplier": when ￿ is low, indirect network e⁄ects
are reinforced and, conversely, when ￿ is high, indirect network e⁄ects are
weakened and there is a competition dampening e⁄ect.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate dynamic price competition between ￿rms,
who strategically interact in two distinct but interrelated markets: primary
markets and aftermarkets. In the primary market ￿rms sell two distinct
versions of a certain original equipment and, afterwards, ￿rms provide CGS
to their costumers (in the aftermarket). In our setting these two markets
are assumed to be closely related, not only because consumers are con-
sidered to be totally locked in to the equipment they buy in the primary
market (i.e. CGS can only be purchased from the equipment manufacturer)
but also because we consider that consumption of CGS exhibit (partially
compatible) indirect network externalities (i.e. consumers bene￿t from the
total number of equipment owners, but the bene￿t exerted by consumers
who own a similar equipment version is greater than the bene￿t exerted by
consumers who own a di⁄erent version of the same original equipment).
In order to analyze the nature of competition under these circumstances,
we propose a linear-quadratic di⁄erential game of two-dimensional price
competition (the price of equipment and the price of CGS) and we analyze
the predictions of our model with respect to the trade-o⁄between competi-
tion in the market (competition in the aftermarket, exploiting the existent
basis of (locked in) consumers) and competition for the market (competi-
tion in the primary market in order to build a durable basis of (locked in)
consumers).
Within the setting previously described, our ￿rst main result is that the
absence of competition in the market (due to consumers￿lock in) e⁄ectively
fosters competition for the market.
In line with the arguments pointed out in competition policy cases such
as Kodak, Xerox or Chrysler, we show that when costumers are totally
locked in to the original equipment￿manufacturers, these are monopolists
in the provision of CGS to their costumers (and consequently competition
in the market is substantially damaged). However, we argue that this
situation is not necessarily welfare detrimental and, we analytically show
that the expectation of monopoly rents in the aftermarket induces ￿rms to
compete more ￿ercely in the primary market (in order to create a durable
basis of costumers and increase the future size of the aftermarket).
Concerning the analysis of the determinants of the intensity of com-
petition for the market, within our setting, several factors might foster
or dampen the intensity of competition for uncolonized consumers in the
28primary market. More precisely: the relative size of the aftermarket, the
intensity of indirect network e⁄ects, the degree of compatibility between
networks and the e⁄ective discount rate. Actually, we show that, in some
circumstances (when the aftermarket is large enough, the network e⁄ects
are su¢ ciently strong, the compatibility between networks is su¢ ciently
weak and the e⁄ective discount rate is su¢ ciently low), competition for
new consumers might become so tough that ￿rms might even have incen-
tives to charge negative equipment prices.
In addition, we have also demonstrated that the incentives to compete
for the market will be larger for ￿rms with a larger basis of costumers in
the primary market (i.e. a larger "locked in" market. Such e⁄ect is entailed
by the dynamic relations between primary markets and aftermarkets: the
larger the existent basis of costumers in the primary market, the greater
will be the monopolist rents obtained in the aftermarket (during several
periods). In any case, when network e⁄ects are not too strong, the increas-
ing returns e⁄ect just described is not su¢ cient to force the smaller ￿rm
to leave the market and, in the steady state LMPE, both ￿rms survive,
sharing the market evenly.
When network e⁄ects are very intense (for a given size of the aftermar-
ket), the game has no competitive LMPE. In our future research, we intend
to investigate whether a monopolistic equilibrium could arise in such cir-
cumstances, pointing out the conditions under which the smaller ￿rm would
be evicted from the market. Other extensions of the model are worthwhile
as well. A natural extension of the model would be to consider ￿nite switch-
ing costs, allowing consumers to switch between brands in the aftermarket.
A second possible extension would be to consider that original equipment
versions are (horizontally) di⁄erentiated at the eyes of consumers and, in
that case, it would be worthy to investigate whether consumers have in-
centives to buy both original equipment (multi-homing). A third possible
extension would be to introduce the possibility of price commitment in the
aftermarket (while price commitment does not seem to be relevant in in-
dustries such as printers, software,... in other industries this commitment
is very important, e.g. in the case of mobile telecommunications).
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Since the actual values ￿i(t) are de￿ned by (13); for rational expectations











for all (D1(t);D2(t)) 2 ￿.
Since there are only two ￿rms, condition (55) implies that once speci￿ed the
function F1(:), it is possible to infer immediately the function F2(:) because of
such functional dependence. Also, given that D2 = 1 ￿ D1, we can write
￿e













￿ f1(1 ￿ D2(t)) ￿ f2(D2(t)):
Since agents are assumed to be forward looking, ￿e
i(t) must be equal to ￿i(t),
i.e., for all t, the following condition must be observed:
￿e
i(t) = fi(Di(t)) =
Z 1
t
[Di(v) + ￿(1 ￿ Di(v))]e￿(r+￿)(v￿t)dv ￿ ￿i(t):
(56)
A special case of interest is the linear expectation rule, where, for D1 2 [0;1]
￿
r + ￿








￿ f1(1 ￿ D2(t)) =
1 + ￿
r + ￿
￿ [￿1 + b1(1 ￿ D2)] ￿ ￿2 + b2D2:
(58)
Comparing (58) with (57), it follows that





￿ b ￿ ￿1; (60)
which correspond, respectively, to equations (26) and (27) in lemma 1:







Similarly, setting D1 = 1 in (57), we obtain
￿
r + ￿
￿ ￿1 + b ￿
1
r + ￿
30which, together with (61) yields the restriction (25) in lemma 1:
Furthermore, the rational expectation requirement that ￿e
i(t) = ￿i(t) im-
plies the restriction that b > 0. To see this, note that ￿e
i(t) = ￿i(t) implies
_ ￿e
i(t) = _ ￿i(t)
which implies, from di⁄erentiating (56) with respect to time,
b _ Di(t) = (r + ￿)￿i(t) ￿ [Di(t) + ￿(1 ￿ Di(t))]
= (r + ￿)￿e
i(t) ￿ [Di(t) + ￿(1 ￿ Di(t))]
= (r + ￿)[￿i + bDi(t)] ￿ [Di(t) + ￿(1 ￿ Di(t))]
This gives us the di⁄erential equation
b _ Di(t) = (r + ￿)[￿i + bDi(t)] ￿ [Di(t) + ￿(1 ￿ Di(t))] (62)
Upon integration, we get
Di(v) =
￿i(r + ￿) ￿ ￿




￿i(r + ￿) ￿ ￿





Substituting this Di(v) into (13) we get
￿i(t) =
￿i(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ b￿




￿i(r + ￿) ￿ ￿






which is equal to ￿e
i(t) = ￿i + bDi(t) if and only if b is strictly positive.￿
Proof of Lemma 2:
Substituting for ￿i(t) in equation (38) using the right-hand side of (37),
replacing pi(t) by ￿i + siDi(t) and rearranging we obtain
d￿i(t)
dt
= Ai + Bi Di(t) (63)
where the values of Ai and Bi are easy to compute.
In equation (37), replace pi(t) by ￿i+siDi(t), then di⁄erentiate with respect







31In the equation (35) for
dDi(t)
dt let us substitute ￿i +siDi(t) for pi(t). Then
substitute the resulting expression for
dDi(t)




= Fi + Gi Di(t) (65)
where the values of Fi and Gi are easy to compute.
In the LMPE of the game it must be that, at each t ￿ 0, and for i = 1;2;
Ai + Bi Di(t) = Fi + Gi Di(t): It follows that Ai = Fi and Bi = Gi:
Equating Bi and Gi for i = 1;2; yields two equations in s1 and s2 :
(r + 2￿)(2si + sj ￿ ab) +
2
2￿
￿(r + ￿)(si + sj ￿ ab)
2 ￿ 2a(￿ ￿ 1) = 0;
(66)
for i = 1;2; j 6= i.
Subtracting the second equation from the ￿rst we obtain
(r + 2￿)(s1￿s2) = 0
Not surprisingly it turns out that s1 = s2 = s : the impact of a ￿rm￿s
current market share on the price it sets is the same for both ￿rms. Now from
equations (66) we obtain the following equation for s :
(r + 2￿)(3s ￿ ab) +
2
2￿
￿(r + ￿)(2s ￿ ab)
2 ￿ 2a(￿ ￿ 1) = 0; (67)
which corresponds to equation (39) in lemma 2:
Equating Ai and Fi for i = 1;2; yields two equations in ￿1 and ￿2: Sub-
tracting the second from the ￿rst, we obtain
(r + ￿)
￿
((3￿ + 4s￿ ￿ 2ab￿)(￿2 ￿ ￿1) + a(￿ + 2s￿ ￿ ab￿)(￿1 ￿ ￿2)) = 0;
(68)
which corresponds to equation (40) in lemma 2:￿
Proof of Lemma 3:











The resulting equation is of the form MDi + Ni = 0. Since this must hold for
all values of Di 2 [0;1], it follows that M = 0, i.e.,
1
2￿
[ab2￿(r + ￿) ￿ 2b(s￿(r + ￿) + ￿(r + 2￿)) + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)] = 0 (69)
32and Ni = 0, i.e.,
￿i =
2b￿(r + ￿)(￿i ￿ ￿j) + ab￿(1 + ￿) ￿ 2bs￿(r + ￿) ￿ 2b￿￿ ￿ 4￿￿
2(r + ￿)(ab￿ ￿ 2￿)
￿
Proof of Lemma 4:
The fact that b1 = b2 = b; stems directly from lemma 1: Similarly, the
condition s1 = s2 = s; follows directly from lemma 2:
Concerning the equilibrium intercepts of consumers￿expectation rules and
￿rms￿price strategies, from equations (68) and (43), one has
(r + ￿)
(ab￿ ￿ 2￿)
(￿1 ￿ ￿2)(6￿ + 8s￿ ￿ 5ab￿) = 0:
From the previous condition, it follows that ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿. Introducing this
in equation (43), one obtains that ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿: ￿
Proof of Proposition 1:
From equation (69) one obtains
s(b) =
ab2￿(r + ￿) + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ b(r + 2￿))
2b￿(r + ￿)
(70)





b3a￿(r + ￿)(r + 2￿)+
b2 ￿
4a￿(￿ + r)(1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿(r + 2￿)2￿
￿





When the LMPE exists, the optimal value(s) of b￿ must be such that condition
(71) holds and




where X(b) is a third-order polynomial in b and:
(i) X(￿1) = ￿1;
(ii) X(+1) = +1;
(iii) X(0) = 8(1 ￿ ￿)2 > 021:
20These thresholds follow directly from lemma 1:
21From (i) and (iii), it follows that X(b) has necessarily one negative root.
33In the absence of network e⁄ects, a = 0; and X(b) would become a second-










Since X(b) is strictly increasing in a for all the values of a > 0; by continuity,
















5a￿(r + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)3
(r + 2￿)2 > 0; (72)
which is is positive as long as a > 0 and ￿ < 1:











￿(a(1 ￿ ￿)(5r + 6￿) ￿ ￿ (6r + 4￿)));
which is negative iif
a ￿
￿(6r + 4￿)








> 0; straightforwardly we can conclude that condition (73)
is su¢ cient to ensure that:
1. the polynomial (71) has two positive roots;
2. only one of those roots satis￿es the equilibrium requirement b￿ ￿
1￿￿
r+￿ and,
consequently, when condition (73) holds, the LMPE of the game exists and,
moreover, it is unique. This corresponds to case (i) in proposition 1:
When condition (73) doesn￿ t hold, two situations might arise:
1. there are two positive roots such that 0 < b￿ ￿
1￿￿
r+￿ and case (ii) in
proposition 1 is observed; or
2. no positive roots satisfy the conditions 0 < b￿ ￿
1￿￿
r+￿ and case (iii) in
proposition 1 arises.











> 0; both cases are possible.




￿10￿(r + 2￿)(1 ￿ ￿)+








= b￿(r + ￿)(6b￿ + 3br + 8(1 ￿ ￿)) > 0:









￿2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(15r3 + 20r2￿ ￿ 12r￿2 ￿ 16￿3)






















there is no LMPE when a >
￿(6r+4￿)
(5r+6￿)(1￿￿) since either X(b) has two positive roots
strictly larger than
1￿￿
r+￿ or it has no positive roots
22. In those circumstances,







; there is a range of values a 2 (
￿(6r+4￿)
(5r+6￿)(1￿￿);a] for which
there exist two LMPE since X(b) has two positive roots lower than
1￿￿
r+￿: In order
to determine the value of a , one only has to ￿nd the positive values of a and b;










and it is easy to show that a >
￿(6r+4￿)
(5r+6￿)(1￿￿) , r <
2￿ p




























5)2 or a >
￿(6r+4￿)







no LMPE exists and the situation (iii) in proposition 1 takes place.￿
Proof of Lemma 6:
Solving (71) with respect to a, one gets
a =
10b￿ ((1 ￿ ￿)(r + 2￿)) ￿ 8￿(1 ￿ ￿)2
b3￿(r + ￿)(r + 2￿) + b2 (4￿(￿ + r)(1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿(r + 2￿)2)
(74)
Introducing condition (74) into equation (70), one gets
s￿(b￿) =
2￿ (r + 2￿)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ b￿(r + 2￿))
￿(r + ￿)(b￿ (r + 2￿) + 4(1 ￿ ￿))
< 0;





; the condition a ￿
￿(6r+4￿)
(5r+6￿)(1￿￿) is not only su¢ cient but also necessary for the existence of a (in
this case unique) LMPE.










where X(b) is a third-order polynomial in b and:
(i) X(￿1) = ￿1;
(ii) X(+1) = +1;
(iii) X(0) = 8(1 ￿ ￿)2 > 024:
Proof of Lemma 7:
Following from Lemma 4, the equilibrium values of ￿i are such that ￿1 =
￿2 = ￿: Introducing such condition in equation (27) from Lemma 1 and solving
for ￿; one gets condition (48)
￿(b) = ￿ =
1 + ￿ ￿ b(r + ￿)
2(r + ￿)
:
The equilibrium values of ￿i as functions of b (equations (49) in lemma 7),
i = 1;2; are obtained by solving the system of equations (40) for ￿1 and ￿2;
then substituting s for its value from equation (70) and ￿nally ￿1 and ￿2 for
their values from equations (48). ￿
Proof of Lemma 8:
From equation (46), it follows that b is a function of r and this fact must be
taken into account when computing limr!1 s￿ (b￿): In order to take this into ac-




r￿ + 2￿￿ ￿ 2s￿2 ￿ 2rs￿



















5r2+11r￿+6￿2 < 0: Thus, when b <
1￿￿
r+￿; s must be larger or equal to
￿2￿
r+2￿
(r+￿)(5r+6￿) and when r ! 1, this is equivalent to say that s must be
larger or equal to 0:
23These thresholds follow directly from lemma 1:
24From (i) and (iii), it follows that X(b) has necessarily one negative root.
36In addition, introducing (75) into (46), we get that a forth-degree polynomial
on r must be equal to 0 and, accordingly, when r ! 1, the coe¢ cient associated
with r4 must be equal to 0: Considering this condition and solving it for s; we









From the possible solutions, s = 0 is the only that respects the condition
s ￿ 0 and, consequently
lim
r!1
s￿ (b￿) = 0:￿
Proof of Proposition 3
The steady-state subscription prices are given by
b pi = ￿i(b￿) + s(b￿) b Di (76)
where b Di is the steady-state market share of ￿rm i, which is equal to 1
2: Intro-
ducing this into (76) and considering the equilibrium values of ￿(b￿) and s(b￿),







b￿2 (r + 2￿)(r + 2￿￿) ￿ b￿(1 ￿ ￿)(5r + 2￿(4 + ￿)) + 4(￿ ￿ 1)
2
￿
b￿2￿(r + ￿)2(4(1 ￿ ￿) + b￿(r + 2￿))
;
which correspond to the values of b p(b￿) pointed out in proposition 3:
Moreover, it is easy to demonstrate that
2￿
￿
b￿2 (r + 2￿)(r + 2￿￿) ￿ b￿(1 ￿ ￿)(5r + 2￿(4 + ￿)) + 4(￿ ￿ 1)
2
￿
b￿2￿(r + ￿)2(4(1 ￿ ￿) + b￿(r + 2￿))
< 0;
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